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1. Introduction 
 
Max Weber (1968) was first to introduce the issue of division of work and 
link it to the related issue of power. Organisational divisions may have different 
tasks, but they are usually interdependent. Staff from various departments participate 
in a decision-making process. Each sub-group has its own goals and personal needs 
of its members, as well as the objectives set by the formal structure. The existence of 
varying sub-goals, and the absence of clear and agreed aspirations about the future 
due to uncertainty in making decisions, are major causes of conflict during the 
decision process (Allison 1969; Ntanos 2009). During the process, sub-groups 
express their interests by making demands on organisational scarce resources, and 
advancing these demands in the bargaining arena. A demand is feasible only when 
sufficient power is mobilised in support of that demand. By holding resources, the 
individual causes a dependency situation that secures his/her position and increases 
his/her power basis, especially in conditions of organisational change. Pettigrew 
(1973) argues that the control of organisational resources increases the holders’ 
power base and ability to influence decisions and allows partial goals to be served. 
Within an organisation the individual is not only governed by the organisational 
structure, but also attempts to shape the structure over time to suit his/her own 
interests and needs. The ability to influence organisational structure is a function of 
power generated by the individual in order to impose on others his/her will. Power is 
not a matter of authority or status, but rather has to do with the control of resources 
and information, and the skilful use of them. Therefore, Power is not only seen as 
operating vertically in the hierarchy, but power relations also may exist among 
‘equal’ standing individuals or sub-units (Pfeffer 1981).  
Power, though affecting broad areas of the organisational domain, was 
neglected as a subject of study for a long period of time for various reasons (Pfeffer 
1981). First, it is a concept that has attracted various interpretations in the social 
science literature, and so could be characterised as problematic. As a way of 
understanding organisational decision-making, it is not unique. Other perspectives 
exist that attract researchers because they do not confront the notion of rationality 
and the existence of commonly accepted organisational goals seeking efficiency. 
Finally, admitting the existence of power relations and of sectional interests, may 
undermine the notion of cohesion in an organisation. This paper aims to raise the 
neglected role of power politics in organisational decision-making. 
Apart from the purely rational perspective and bounded-rational perspective, 
there is a notion of rationality in the political perspective of decision-making (Jones 
1992). Rationality here refers to the way in which each interest group conceives 
their surrounding context, faces uncertainty and responds to a perceived problem 
(Dermer & Lucas 1986). Within the political perspective, rationality has not a 
neutral but an ideological intense meaning, since there are many views of what 
rational behaviour is, based on various interpretations of reality. We aim to depict 
that accounting information is used politically in order to forward a certain 
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interpretation of reality as truth, usually the most powerful interpretation. The role of 
accounting may therefore lie not on making rational decisions, but in helping 
politically made choices to be accepted. This does not imply that these decisions are 
irrational; on the contrary, behind politically made decisions lies rational action from 
an interest group that is purposefully pursuing the solution best suited to its own 
aims.  
 
2.  The Definition of Power 
 
Pfeffer referred to power as “the capability of one social actor to overcome 
resistance in achieving a desired objective or result” (1981, p. 2). Dahl (1957) 
defined power “as a relation where one social actor can get another social actor to do 
something that would not otherwise have done”. Finally, Mintzberg (1983, p. 4) 
gives a wider definition; power is the capacity to effect organisational outcomes. 
Every member of the organisation has the potential of using power either for 
resisting or reproducing formal power vested in the organisational rules and 
structures (Hardy & Clegg 1996). 
Authority is seen as the ‘legitimate’ power in formal organisations (Pfeffer 
1981), which is invested in organisational positions (Buchanan & Huczynski 1997). 
Authority draws on the norms, beliefs and practices that are accepted within the 
organisational settings, and is linked with the institutionalisation of social control, 
which is part of the organisational life. Authority is based not only on rewards or 
sanctions, but also on social norms in order to secure members’ compliance with 
organisational goals. Accepted social rules define which parts of power are 
considered to be legitimate, and act as a way of influencing behaviour. The 
displacement of legitimate power is due to either distortions in formal goals, or use 
of legitimate by from employees to serve personal interests, taking advantage of 
inefficiencies in control systems (Mintzberg 1983).  
Mintzberg (1983) has characterised political behaviour in organisations as 
being illegitimate, delusive and against corporate goals and cohesion, while only 
legitimate power can promote ‘commonly accepted’ objectives and direct 
personnel’s behaviour towards goal completion. Some managerial theorists (e.g. 
Mintzberg 1983; Pfeffer 1981) suggest that legitimate power is directly linked with 
hierarchy and authority, so inevitably derives from the organisational structure. 
‘Illegitimate’ power, lying outside formal structures, has been associated with 
conflicting interests in the organisation and resource dependency as a source of 
power (Pfeffer 1981). A criticism of the above conception of power is that it does 
not challenge ‘legitimate’ power, viewing negatively informal aspects of power 
(politics) and limiting power only to the control of scarce resources (Hardy & Clegg 
1996). The mainstream management literature that adopts a negative stance towards 
informal power and political activity within the organisation is strongly criticised for 
not distinguishing managerial interests from organisational needs (Buchanan & 
Huczynski 1997). Top managers also pursue their interests through their position in 
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the hierarchical structure, but often manage to present that as formal organisational 
goals. In the main, management theorists tend to ignore “how power becomes 
embedded in a company’s structure, culture, practice, rules and regulations” 
(Buchanan & Huczynski 1997, p. 701). The conditions under which organisational 
actors might behave politically are discussed next. 
 
3.  Conditions for the Exercise of Political Behavior 
 
Political behaviour in decision-making is defined “as behaviour by 
individuals, or, in collective terms, by sub-units, within an organisation that makes a 
claim against the resource-sharing system of the organisation” (Pettigrew 1973, p. 
169). Political behaviour has been explained using several factors. First, the 
structural and task differentiation (division of labour), and any existing differences 
in organisational members’ background and socialisation process may lead to the 
development of divisive perceptions and intentions (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1981). 
In particular, poorly institutionalised social systems, without a clear set of 
objectives, are more likely to facilitate power-related conflicts (Pettigrew, 1973).  
Second, the evolution of the power structure and the nature of relations 
among the organisational actors over a long period of time may affect political 
behaviour. Knowing the nature of power relations is not enough in itself; the process 
by which power structure emerged should be known as well (Pettigrew 1973). Third, 
a complex and changing task environment such as investing in a foreign country is 
likely to lead to uncertainty in decision-making (Sykianakis & Ballas 2006). 
Uncertainty is perceived differently among people and might facilitate power 
conflicts among various interest groups or even within the subsystem dealing with 
the task of decision-making (Pettigrew 1973). Fourth, scarcity in organisational 
resources, which is interrelated with all the above reasons, can lead to conflicts 
(Pfeffer 1981; Sykianakis & Ballas 2006; Ntanos 2009). Scarce resources should be 
critical to the organisation or at least shown to be critical (Pfeffer 1981). All these 
factors cannot be seen separately, but are connected with the creation of structural 
divisions in the organisation (Pettigrew 1973).  
The distribution of power within business organisations is concentrated at 
the top of the hierarchy, mainly due to concentrated ownership or strong managerial 
control (Pfeffer 1981). Business organisations are less overtly political compared to 
non-profit ones, since profit maximisation dominates as a rationalised, clear and 
commonly accepted objective (Pfeffer 1981). When power is centralised, the margin 
for opposition is narrowed. The dominant coalition exercises its authority in order to 
impose its preferences and way of meanings. The aim is to submerge disagreements 
and rationalise the decisions made. Staff with conflicting views face difficulties in 
openly challenging these dominant preferences. When power is more dispersed 
conflict can exist more clearly, and political behaviour emerges as the means by 
which one set of goals, preferences or beliefs prevails (Pfeffer 1981). 
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Often, formal systems cannot satisfy all of the individual’s needs for 
personal security and status, so political behaviour plays that role (Pettigrew 1973). 
The ambiguity lying behind change or innovation leads managers to value this 
situation on the grounds of how their status and career would be affected. With the 
use of power, the individual may try to secure his/her position and promote career 
goals by influencing the formation of sub-unit or organisational goals. Therefore, 
innovative decision-making (as in the case of capital investment projects) is perhaps 
better characterised by conflict and bargaining than by problem solving, due to 
participants’ varying perceptions and interests (Pettigrew 1973; Sykianakis & Bellas 
2005). Conflict may arise between actors promoting change and those who resist in 
fear of loosing privileges (Pettigrew 1973). Major, novel decisions are expected to 
alter the resource allocation system. For instance, an investment project will lead to 
resources being allocated in certain directions and new resources will be generated 
from its implementation. Sub-groups participating in the project’s appraisal will try 
to shape the process, so that the outcome fits their interests, and political action and 
conflict will probably ensue (Sykianakis & Ballas 2006). Political behaviour is 
feasible only when an organisational actor controls some kind of power source. 
Sources of power are the subject of the following section. 
 
4.   Sources of Power 
 
The majority of management theorists adopt a pluralist notion of power. 
Pluralism as political theory emerged from the study of making decisions in 
American local communities and its basic conception is that there is not a single 
governing elite but a plurality of powerful actors that manage in different occasions 
to prevail (Clegg 1989a). Transferring these ideas in the study of organisations, 
pluralism sees the subject of study as an open political system where a disparity of 
interests, goals and values is the norm (Burrell & Morgan 1979). The pluralist view 
presupposes that power does not exist independently, but is always referred to in 
relation to something else (Dahl 1957, cited in Pfeffer 1981). A certain actor is 
powerful compared to another actor. The pluralist approach expresses power as 
resource dependency. “Dependency is thus a result of an imbalance of exchange 
between individuals, together with the associated ability of one individual to control 
others through the possession of resources” (Pettigrew 1973, p. 139). Therefore, 
dependency of any kind (funds, expertise, information, control of uncertainty, etc) is 
a basis of power. A dependency situation should better not leave serious alternatives 
open to the subjected group. The power basis is used for promoting the sub-group’s 
interests, through effecting decision outcomes.  
Pfeffer (1981) mentions the following sources of power. First, dependence 
is often linked with the scarcity of resources. Thus budgeting, for example, which is 
a resource allocation process, is viewed politically (Wildavsky 1975). Second, 
expert power could also be considered as a resource dependent situation. Few people 
holding critical knowledge for the organisation are to some extent irreplaceable. 
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Knowing their power basis, expert staff may try to maintain their status in the 
structure by exercising their power. Third, effective coping with uncertainty is a 
resource dependency situation, associated with access to information sources 
(Hickson et al. 1971). Dependency increases when a sub-unit’s functioning is 
difficult to substitute and has a central position in the organisation (Hinings et al. 
1974). Finally, affecting the decision-making process includes control over the 
decision premises (constraints, goals and objectives, values and norms), the 
considered alternatives and the control of information about the alternatives 
(Pettigrew 1972). Control over the considered alternatives and the relevant 
information implies that decision makers would favour the solution most beneficial 
to them.  
In order for somebody to exercise power within an organisation, three 
prerequisites should exist (Mintzberg 1983). First, the person should control some 
bases of power such as a resource, a technical skill or specific knowledge that is 
critical to the organisation. In addition, authority (legal or formal power) or direct 
access to somebody with power is a basis for power. Second, a powerful actor must 
have the will to exercise power. Finally, political skills are necessary in handling 
power. Political skills, deriving either from the structural position or the individual’s 
personal characteristics, are determinants of individual power. Typical examples are 
the individual’s position in a junction of informational flows (Pettigrew 1972) or 
membership in a given division (Pfeffer 1981). Actors in equal, horizontal 
hierarchical positions do not necessarily share the same degree of power since some 
sub-units attract more power than others. Finally, personal characteristics that 
enhance individual power include knowledge about the distribution of power, 
understanding of the decision process and self-belief in one’s own position. The use 
of a power basis held characterises organisational politics, and is discussed next. 
 
5.  The Exercise of Power (Organizational Politics) 
 
Various definitions of organisational politics have been presented. 
Wildavsky (1979) says that “politics involves how differing preferences are resolved 
in conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources”. Similarly, Allen et al. (1979) 
sees that “organisational politics involve intentional acts of influence to enhance or 
protect the self-interest of individuals or groups.” According to Pfeffer (1981, p. 7) 
“organisational politics involves those activities taken within organisations to 
acquire, develop and use power and other resources to obtain one’s preferred 
outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices”. 
The purpose of political activity is to allow some organisational actors to tackle the 
resistance or opposition of other organisational members in a given choice situation. 
Politics is the exercise of power that intends to influence the outcomes of 
organisational decision-making to allow actors to accomplish their own goals and 
interests, or to secure their power base and status (Pfeffer 1981). 
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Mintzberg (1983, p.172) defined organisational politics as “...individual or 
group behaviour that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and above 
all, in the technical sense, illegitimate-sanctioned neither by formal authority, 
accepted ideology, nor certified expertise; though it may exploit any one of these”. 
Clegg (1989b) criticised the pluralist approach of Mintzberg and others for not 
recognising structures of power and dominance in the systems of authority, ideology 
and expertise and limiting the issue of power only to the ‘parochial’ system of 
power. 
Organisational politics (OP) are related to the pursuit of individual or 
collective interests as opposed to organisational goals (Pfeffer 1981; Pettigrew 
1973). On the other hand, organisational politics can be seen as having a central 
position in the process of goal formulation (Knights & Murray 1994). Organisational 
goals emerge from personal or group interests through a process taking place under 
certain rules. Individual and collective actors participating in OP seek to secure 
material and symbolic resources. Personal goals are not necessarily antithetical to 
formal ones, but may be when the former do not attract considerable support in the 
organisation. Even though the pursuit of career goals is something broadly 
acknowledged, OP should not occur explicitly because it is possible that resistance 
and conflict would be more intense. The political game is not performed as an open 
clash, but is often hidden and involves various alliances among people and sub-
groups. Constructing their reality, managers tend to deny political activities and 
instead they focus on formal goals. The dominant rationalistic interpretations of 
managerial practice favour meritocratic beliefs rather than political action for 
promoting career objectives (Knights & Murray 1994). Because political behaviour 
is often perceived negatively, actors seek to legitimise their possession of power 
(Pettigrew 1973). This reduces resistance from other parts of the organisation and 
assists them in achieving their goals. Legitimacy may be achieved through the 
rationalisation of the suggested course of action, and the imposition of power is also 
sustained through the use of symbols of status. The next section looks in detail at the 
application of political tactics for imposing power. 
 
6.  Political Tactics in Organizations 
 
In a previous section it was noted that power is subject to an actor’s position 
in the organisational structure and his/her degree of mutual dependence with other 
members of the organisation. However, organisational actors can enhance their 
power by applying political strategies and tactics that allow them to overcome some 
of the constraints they face from structural conditions. Mintzberg (1985) views 
politics as one of many systems of influence in the organisation. According to 
Mintzberg, organisational politics could be seen as numerous political games; he 
identified thirteen of them. The selected political games that follow provide a useful 
background to the present case study.  
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First, in the alliance building game managers form informal coalitions for 
mutual support. Coalition formation is considered to be a strategy for the alignment 
of power (Pfeffer 1981). Coalitions could either be external or internal (Mintzberg 
1983), but the basis for a coalition is in both cases mutual interests between its 
members. External coalition is when a sub-unit forms alliance with independent 
groups outside the organisation that may influence the policymaking, while internal 
alliances usually formed around groups with common beliefs and a limited share of 
power.  
The empire building game is when line managers want to form their own 
‘strongholds’. It could refer to a SBU or a foreign subsidiary. The budgeting game is 
linked with the empire building game and has to do with attracting resources into a 
specific group or division. Budgeting has been studied as a political process of 
resource allocation (Pfeffer & Salancik 1974; Wildavsky 1975), control, and 
preservation of power structures (Covaleski & Dirsmith 1986). The line vs. staff 
game refers to who controls the decision-making process. A typical example might 
be power sharing between the operational and corporate structure. The strategic 
candidates game is where sub-groups seek to promote their own candidates and in 
so doing use other political games.  
Finally, the expertise game is when experts try to secure their position, 
influence and power base by using their expert knowledge. A similar case is the use 
of outside experts (consultants) that are hired to deal with a specific task (Pfeffer 
1981). Experts are considered to be objective and specialised observers and their 
suggestions may be used for legitimising decisions and seizing opposition from 
other parties. It is highly probable that the consultants’ suggestions will favour the 
person or the sub-unit that had the initiative and the authority to hire them for the 
specific task (Mintzberg 1985). Consultants are more often hired by organisations 
with dispersed power or high divisionalised structure. Also, they tend to be hired for 
critical issues that give the potential for intense political activity such as 
organisational re-structuring or the introduction of a new MIS (Mintzberg 1985).  
Another way of exercising power in order to reduce opposition to certain 
policies is by preventing a decision from appearing openly as the outcome of a 
visible process. Bachrach & Baratz (1962) discussed limiting the political process to 
safe issues and determining what would be included in the agenda in order to favour 
the power holder, who normally wishes to preserve the status quo. If sensitive issues 
are to rise publicly then they may be challenged in a political process. Bachrach & 
Baratz (1962) challenged the pluralist view of power and first introduced the 
discussion of other dimensions of power. These concepts are considered next. 
 
7.  The Management of Meaning 
 
When defining power, views from some management theorists (e.g. Pfeffer 
1981; Mintzberg 1983) that present organisational structures and systems as neutral 
and apolitical and which distinguish ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ power, have 
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been criticised (e.g. Hardy & Clegg 1996). Pluralism views decision-making 
through the spectrum of a socio-political process. Even though conflict over scarce 
resources is widely recognised, it is often considered as negative because the idea of 
commonly agreed organisational goals still remains in a pluralist perspective 
(Knights & Murray 1994). Lukes (1974) criticised pluralism as being superficial and 
restrictive in the explanation it gives to political or societal phenomena. He 
developed the concept of the “three dimensions of power”. The first dimension of 
power is attributed to the theory of pluralism. In the pluralist conception of power, 
the issue of observable conflict between agents, who have subjective interests, is a 
prerequisite. The pluralists’ view of power shapes also their approach and research 
methods for studying power. They focus on behaviour and seek to know who 
prevails in organisational decision-making.  
 The two-dimensional view of power is based on the work of 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963). These authors criticised pluralism for ignoring 
the role of created social values and institutional practices in limiting the attention to 
few parts of the entire spectrum of the political process. According to them, power is 
imposed in different ways such as coercion, influence, authority, force and 
manipulation. They developed the concept of non-decisions, which account for 
actions to be followed without being previously decided under a certain process, in 
order to avoid resistance from other organisational actors. Their concept is to some 
extent anti-behavioural since it does not restrict its scope to observable human 
behaviour. On the other hand, they treat non-decisions as decisions and they discuss 
both overt and covert conflict. So, despite criticisms expressed, the two-dimensional 
view of power shares some common features with the theory of pluralism (Lukes 
1974). The concept of non-decisions has been widely criticised because it lacks 
actual evidence, or at least it is difficult to prove that non-decisions exist (Miller et 
al. 1996). 
Lukes (1974) introduced a third dimension of power, the shaping of 
people’s perceptions and preferences so that they willingly adopt certain behaviour. 
The third dimension has been associated with societal mechanisms that preserve the 
status quo by expressing dominant culture and beliefs, thus preventing conflict from 
arising. Based on Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional view, power has been recognised 
for legitimising, justifying and giving meaning through the use of symbols to 
institutions and by that preventing opposition. Some research has focused on the 
management domain and the relevant use of symbolic power for justifying actions 
taken by top executives (Pettigrew 1977; Pfeffer 1981). This approach tries to link 
pluralist with more radical views of power, though remaining at an organisational 
micro-level and having managerial implications (Hardy & Clegg 1996).  
By recognising a situation that needs to be altered, participants put their own 
demands on the strategy generation process regarding how change should take place. 
The choice of demands to be processed, as well as the choice of action to be 
followed, characterises the political nature of strategic decision-making (Pettigrew 
1977). The political character of the process is completed with the necessary 
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mobilisation of power in support of the demands posed through the process. Apart 
from demand generation and power mobilisation, a third characteristic of political 
behaviour affects which demands will be forwarded or rejected in the process, based 
on the construction of meaning and collective consciousness in the organisation 
(Pettigrew 1977). The creation of meaning is related to the legitimisation of one’s 
political and cultural objectives with the application of rational and analytical terms 
(Pettigrew 1977, 1985a). Organisational actors wishing to advance their demands 
should present them in a ‘legitimate’ way. Pettigrew (1985a) views structures, 
cultures and strategies not as value-free constructs, but as existing to serve the 
dominant coalition’s interests in the organisation. Corporate ideology and culture 
provide stability since they represent a collective and established way of interpreting 
reality “for a given group at a given time” (Pettigrew 1985a, p. 283). Also, dominant 
organisational culture acts as a legitimisation mechanism for a system, filtering and 
evaluating signals from inside and outside the organisation to suggest which 
demands should be acceptable and which not in the firm’s decision process 
(Pettigrew 1987).  
Affecting the way people perceive their reality and give meaning to their 
actions is a powerful aspect of the strategic decision process. The construction and 
preservation of meaning is achieved with the use of symbols, language, beliefs, 
myths and the establishment of values. Language, like management accounting, 
carries not only information but meaning as well (Pettigrew 1977). Carriers of 
meaning are useful to the dominant group since they provide a power basis for 
legitimising their demands while de-legitimising others’ conflicting demands during 
the decision process. Information plays a particularly important symbolic role in 
organisations, providing assurance that decisions are rational and efficient (Feldman 
& March 1981). Organisational members may ask for more information, even 
though they cannot always process it. More information offers legitimacy to 
decisions made, by conferring to the process a notion of intelligent and scientific 
choice, which characterise modernity (Feldman & March 1981). Particularly, the 
uses of management accounting information will be considered in detail next.  
 
8.  The Role of Accounting Information and Management Control Systems 
 
It has been argued that the role of accounting systems is not only to provide 
information for decision making and to facilitate control in a business, but in fact 
accounting is involved in different ways with organisational practice (Burchell et al. 
1980). Accounting information could serve the accomplishment of various company 
goals or be used by staff in order to promote their personal objectives. Burchell et al. 
(1980) presented a set of organisational roles, which interact with the accounting 
system and determine the uses of accounting information. Accounting information 
could serve as an answer or learning machine in structured situations with low 
ambiguity over objectives. When objectives are not clear, then accounting 
information has political and symbolic uses. It is political when it is used as 
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ammunition, as an argument in situations of bargaining between conflicting interest 
groups. Also, information is used as a source of power, where its holders may 
exercise control and surveillance over those who do not have it. Knowing the 
significance and power behind the control of management accounting control 
systems (MACS), organisational actors try to shape their functioning and the 
outcomes (information) produced. Finally, accounting plays a rationalisation role, 
used to justify decisions already made. The symbolic uses of accounting, legitimises 
organisational goals and provides a language for communication and action.  
Accounting can be viewed as having both rational (objective) and natural 
(symbolic, sense making) functions (Boland & Pondy 1983). Rational uses of 
accounting emphasise its functional role in assisting decision-making with 
calculations of costs and benefits. The natural use of accounting provides a symbolic 
language that allows organisational members to interpret social reality and provide 
meaning to their acts. Accounting is a way of communicating ideas and subjective 
views, objectives and actions to be taken, within the organisational setting. “As 
ritual, accounting brings structure and significance to budgeting, planning and 
evaluation processes. Through its use, new members come to understand and old 
members find reinforcement for the shared interpretive schemes of their 
organisation” (Boland & Pondy 1983; p. 225).  
Ansari and Euske (1987) explored the role of accounting information, 
having in mind that rational models of decision-making do not provide adequate 
interpretations. Following a similar classification to Burchell et al. (1980) they 
identified three theoretical perspectives on the use of accounting information: 
1. technical-rational, which is driven by considerations of efficiency;  
2. socio-political, which is the pursuit of power and influence, and;  
3. institutional, which stems from the need to put on an appropriate façade for 
the world to see (Ansari & Euske 1987; p. 553). 
Their empirical findings have shown that the rational-technical perspective 
is an idealisation, where in reality there is a rationalisation of organisational action 
and accounting information is used as a way to justify these actions to participants. 
Especially in situations of ambiguous goals, the political and symbolic uses of 
accounting information are intensified. Commenting on Boland & Pondy (1983), 
Meyer (1983) suggests that accounting structures are myths aimed at presenting 
organisations as bounded, unified and rational, acting towards the completion of 
agreed goals. These myths provide legitimacy to the organisation and its actions in 
the eyes of its members and the external environment. Accounting myths and 
legitimating rationality help to keep the organisation together and therefore promote 
its survival. Information, such as accounting information, can be viewed as a 
power resource that may be used for promoting personal or sub-group interests, 
especially by those having the ability to do so. Pettigrew (1972) noticed that 
gatekeepers actors (holding strategic positions at the junction of various 
communication channels), controlled the flow of information within organisations or 
information exchanges with the environment. Managers tried to influence 
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information systems because control over their function confers power to the 
controller. Influence is exercised over the informational outcome produced. In 
particular, when the data produced is expected to be more subjective and uncertain, 
there is more space for political behaviour. Interest groups produce biased estimates, 
which highlight the advantages of their suggestions and underestimate the 
weaknesses (Birnberg et al. 1983). 
Management control systems (MCS) and accounting information are 
directly related with intra-organisational power because they are used in decision-
making, and in performance measurement and evaluation, and offer legitimacy in 
activities since accounting symbolises rationality and objectivity (Marcus & Pfeffer 
1983). Accounting information in evolving organisations is a means of shaping 
perceptions, regulating conflict and imposing control (Dermer 1990). Having in 
mind the power embedded in the use of MCS, their design has a political character 
as well. Therefore, contextual and organisational factors such as power relations 
should be considered in the design of MCS, otherwise their adoption could face 
resistance from some parts of the organisation (Marcus & Pfeffer 1983). Resistance 
is expected when the power distribution implied from the MCS does not correspond 
to the distribution from other power determinants in the organisation, to the 
dominant organisational culture or the prevailing assumptions on the role of 
technology and accounting (Marcus & Pfeffer 1983; Ballas & Tsoukas 2004). 
Control systems are means used by the conflicting groups but also are created from 
conflict. Budgets or business plans as control instruments are the products of 
interaction between interest groups, but are used as rationalising and legitimising 
factors in the conflict (Dermer & Lucas 1986).  
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has raised the role of politics as a theoretical framework for 
viewing decision-making. Choice or change is not programmable, it is “a 
consequence not just of rational problem-solving processes, or of the weight of 
technical evidence and analysis” (Pettigrew 1985b, p. 27). Therefore, decisions and 
change are due less to the action and the personality of a leader or top decision-
maker less normative models would suggest (Pettigrew 1987). Decision-making is 
the outcome of a dynamic process, where power holders struggle for status and their 
perceived interests, and form a new net of relations. As already mentioned, the 
organisation is comprised of various interest groups which “are likely to have 
different goals, time orientations, values, and problem solving styles. In short, they 
may have different rationalities, which provide the motive forces for their actions 
and reactions, along with the language and styles of behaviour to express those 
actions” (Pettigrew 1985a, p. 281). Conflict arises from the existence of different 
and opposing rationalities. The exercise of power is directly associated with the 
manipulation of accounting of accounting information. Hirst and Baxter (1993) 
recognised accounting’s rationalising, justifying and legitimising role which assists 
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in minimising conflict. Rationalisation mobilises support for a course of action by 
deflecting attention from the quest of personal or sub-group interests. Accounting 
information assists the covert exercise of power, having an active role in shaping 
beliefs and constructing meaning associated with political behaviour. 
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